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Weiss and Agassi: Playing the Game of International Law

PLAYING THE GAME OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Uri Weiss* & Joseph Agassi**
ABSTRACT
In the realist game of international negotiations, each state
attempts to promote their interest regardless of international law.
Thus, it is negotiations in the shadow of the sword, i.e., a negotiation
in which each side knows that if the parties will not achieve an
agreement, the alternative may be a war, and thus the bargaining
position of each party is a function of their capacities in a case of war.
Negotiation in the shadow of international law is an alternative to it: in
this alternative the parties negotiate according to their international
legal rights. It reduces injustice and incentive to armament and to
terror. It thus promotes peace. A state can choose unilaterally to play
the game of negotiations in accord with international law by merely
respecting the rights of one’s neighbours regardless to their waving
swords, and by this have much more peace and generate incentives
against terror and armament. This efficiently brings much more
security and peace. A policy of respecting international law, combined
with conditional generosity, is more efficient. The wish for peace
should make a country encourage its neighbours to avoid armament.
The best way to do so is to adopt a policy of unilateral respect for
international law and conditional generosity towards one’s neighbours.
The international community should enforce, or at least encourage,
negotiations in accord with international law.
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PREFACE
What game of international dispute-resolution should be
chosen by the planners and by the players of international relations?
What should be the place of international courts in conflict resolutions?
What is the best response to negotiation failure?
Peace negotiation is clearly better than war. Even a negotiation
between robbers and their victims are notoriously better than murder.
Of course, every submission to a robber encourages robberies; one of
the advantages of international law is that it encourages replacing
terror with compromise. In the language of the social contract theory:
when a state plays as if it is a Hobbesian “natural state,” namely, a
game without any valid law in which “[h]omo homini lupus” (“a man
is a wolf to another man”), 1 they will be robbed much more if they play
as if it is a “political state.” 2 This is so, since from the point of view
of the state that believes that international relations represent a
Hobbesian “natural state,” 3 every demand by the other side is a
robbery, and there is no distinction between legitimate demands and
illegitimate demands. We argue that while a state recognizes
international law, the state plays a game of political state and thus is
robbed much less. Thus, when a state recognizes international law,
they declare their right not to be robbed.4 By this, they play a less

1

See FRANS DE WAAL, PRIMATES AND PHILOSOPHERS: HOW MORALITY EVOLVED 3
(2016) (De Waal claimed: “Homo homini lupus—“man is wolf to man”—is an
ancient Roman proverb popularized by Thomas Hobbes.”).
2
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 17 (1651), available at
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm. Hobbes claimed, “[a]nd
in all places, where men have lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one
another, has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the Law of Nature,
that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was their honour; and men observed
no other Lawes therein, but the Lawes of Honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty,
leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry.” Id.
3
MICHAEL JOSEPH SMITH, REALIST THROUGH FROM WEBER TO KISSINGER 13 (1986)
(claims Hobbes's "analysis of the state of nature remains the defining feature of
realist thought. His notion of the international state of nature as a state of war is
shared by virtually everyone calling himself a realist.”).
4
Thomas Hobbes claimed that “before constitution of Soveraign Power (as hath
already been shewn) all men had right to all things; which necessarily causeth
Warre.”
Thomas Hobbes, The Project Gutenberg eBook of Leviathan,
GUTENBERG.ORG, https://gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm (last visited
Aug. 10, 2022).
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dangerous game, a game that protects their citizens from terrorism. We
will explain this argument in this paper.
There are many different potential games of international
negotiation: one extreme game is that if negotiation fails, one country
has the power to force the other to settle the court with a universal
jurisdiction and a capacity to enforce their decision. When the states
play the negotiation game, they play the game of negotiation in the
shadow of the law. Another possible negotiation game is one in which
each country attempts to maximize their benefits regardless of the law,
and if negotiation fails, they will settle their conflict by war. When
they negotiate, they play the game of negotiation in the shadow of the
war.
The first game will be played in a world with a court with
universal jurisdiction and an effective mechanism to enforce their
decisions. A game of negotiation in the shadow of the law will also be
played in a non-utopian world. It will be the case, if the two states
respect international law enough. The two states may choose to litigate
if they fail to reach agreement. When this is the case, we will see many
fewer territorial disputes, and thus the solution of conflict by this
mechanism is much less visible, namely, the illusion is that this
mechanism is neglected. 5
Moreover, a state may choose to respect international law
regardless of the choice of the other state, and by this choose the game.
Despite the unilateral acceptance of international law, international
law may influence the two parties' negotiation. This will be the case
particularly, when a side that may achieve more territory by sword than
it is entitled by international law, will subject itself to international law.
Thus, it is much more important that the strong side will accept
international law, since the strong side is the one that can take more
territory than it is entitled by international law.
Games of international negotiation in the shadow of
international law reduces injustice in international relations, and
reduces terrorism, arming and wars. We recommend to any state that
faces conflict to invite the other side publicly: let’s negotiate, and if the
negotiation fails, let’s go to the international court of justice. The
choice of a state not to rob even when it can rob without paying,
5

This is similar to the friendship paradox: since people with more friends are more
visible, people tend to think that others have more friends than they have. See Scott
L. Feld, Why Your Friends Have More Friends Than You Do, 96 AM. J. SOCIO. 1464,
1464–77 (1991).
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incentivizes the other side not to arm. It is also more important that
the strong side, the side that may achieve by sword more than it is
entitled by law, will be subject to international law. Yet even the weak
side can invite the strong side publicly for an international
adjudication. For It, it is (almost) a no-lose strategy: it will gain if the
strong side accepts its proposal, and it will gain even if the strong side
does not accept its public proposal since by this the strong side will
lose legitimacy to attack and to justify it by raising a self-defense
claim. When a weak side relinquishes transparency, it pays an
enormous price (that usually it cannot see because of the lack of
transparency).
In an ideal world, the international community will force the
game of negotiation under the shadow of international law. However,
it does not mean that partial universal jurisdiction is always better than
jurisdiction that is based on the mutual consent of the states. 6 The
realists claim that we do not live in an ideal world, and hence
international law does not matter.7 As such, there is no such thing as
international law.8 We argue that, by a unilateral acceptance of
international law, a state defends itself, that international law is a sine
qua non that states will not rob and will not be robbed.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Let us now discuss in the common language of international
relations: what states should do if negotiation fails? There are states
that, in this case, will go to war, and there are states that in this case
will go to international adjudication.
How should international conflict be solved? What should a
country that faces a conflict do? According to the traditional approach,
the conflict should be solved at the negotiation table.9 This solution is
6

See Uri Weiss, The ICC Should Not Encourage Occupation, 37 TOURO L. REV.
797, 797 (2021).
7
See Gregory Shaffer, Legal Realism and International Law (U.C. Irvine School of
Law, Research Paper No. 2018-55, 2021). They claimed that “[l]egal realism is not
IR realism and should not be confused with it. IR realism views international law as
epiphenomenal because state power, and not law, determines international relations
outcomes." Id.
8
See John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?, 10
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 48 (2000).
9
Let us see some examples to this approach regarding the contemporary conflicts.
Zelensky claimed that the war could only come to a conclusive halt "at the
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probably better than war: “in peace sons bury their fathers, but in war
fathers bury their sons.”10 However, what should be the case if
negotiation fails? One possibility is that in this case the conflict will
be solved through litigation.11 This will turn the negotiation be a
negotiation in the shadow of the law. Another possibility is to go to
another negotiation if negotiation fails, and this raises the question,
what to do if the additional negotiation fails. Infinite negotiation may
lead to the freezing of the status quo, even if the status quo is a status
quo of war. Another possibility is that the conflict will be settled by
sword, if negotiation fails. This is the approach of Carl von

negotiating table." Zelensky: Only Diplomacy Can End Ukraine War, BBC NEWS
(May 21, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61535353.
The
possibility of going to arbitration has not been mentioned as an option. Regarding
the conflict in Yemen, “‘[w]hat has been most frustrating during my time […] has
been the absence of comprehensive peace talks,’ said Martin Griffiths, Special Envoy
of the Secretary-General for Yemen, during his briefing to the Security Council,
adding that he had emphasized time and again the primacy of a political process to
negotiate the core political and security issues needed to end the war. The last time
the Government of Yemen and Ansar Allah, or the Houthis, sat down to discuss the
sticking issues was in Kuwait in 2016, he said, ‘[o]nly a negotiated political
settlement can truly turn the tide in Yemen,’ he said, arguing that a mediator is not
responsible for the war nor for the peace, despite the common assumption to the
contrary. Rather, the mediator’s privilege is to present to the parties the ways the
war can end, he stressed.” Negotiated Political Settlement Only Way to End War,
UNITED NATIONS (June 15, 2021), https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14552.doc.htm.
Furthermore, “[s]ome countries claim, more or less, that the ICC should not have
jurisdiction over the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, since the conflict should
be solved via negotiation. See generally Situation in Palestine, Case No. ICC-ICC01/18, Public Document: Submissions Pursuant to Rule 103 (Uri Weiss) (Mar. 16,
2020),
https://www.icccpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2020_01105.PDF. See also Raphael
Ahren, Why the Palestinian Case at the Hague Took A Big Hit This Past Week, THE
TIMES OF ISRAEL (Feb. 21, 2020 9:40 AM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/why-thepalestinian-case-at-the-hague-took-a-big-hit-this-week/.
10
HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES, Book I, ch. 87, § 4.
11
The Palestine Mandate, YALE L. SCHOOL LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. LIBRARY (2008),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp;
The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between
the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to
the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such
dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the
Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations.

Id.
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Clausewitz, who said that “[w]ar is nothing but a continuation of
political intercourse with an admixture of other means.”12
It is possible to imagine what to do if negotiation fails: that the
strong world powers will force a solution.13 An alternative is that the
Security Council will force a solution;14 however, the fact that the five
permanent members have a veto power may prevent a resolution.15
How should the international community organize the world,
such that conflict will be solved in a better way? What should be the
jurisdictions of international courts? What policy toward international
law states should take, even unilaterally?
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For years, there was no effective legal mechanism for
international law enforcement. 16 For the traditional doctrine of
international law assigned a court jurisdiction only with the consent of
both parties, the complainant state, and the claimant state. Further, one
of the strong doctrines of international law was, and largely remains,
12

See KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 596 (O.J. Matthijs Jolles trans., 1943).
A historical example to a forced solution may be that the U.S. forced Japan to
adopt their liberal constitution.
14
We can illustrate this by the Security Council’s Resolution 134, 181, 392, and 418
regarding South Africa. See (S/RES/134), (S/RES/181), S/RES/392), (S/RES/418).
The last one imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. We can
partially illustrate this by the Security Council’s Resolutions 242 and 228 regarding
the Israeli-Arab conflict. See (S/RES/242), (S/RES/338).
15
See U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶¶ 1-3. “Each member of the Security Council shall have one
vote.” Id. at ¶ 1. “Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by
an affirmative vote of nine members.” Id. at ¶ 2. “Decisions of the Security Council on all
other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the
concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under
Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain
from voting.” Id. at ¶ 3.
16
See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 208 (1832);
13

[T]he law obtaining between nations is not positive law: for every positive
law is set by a given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of
subjection to its author . . . [T]he law obtaining between nations is law
(improperly so called) set by general opinion. The duties which it imposes
are enforced by moral sanctions: by fear on the part of nations, or by fear
on the part of sovereigns, of provoking general hostility, and incurring its
probable evils, in case they shall violate maxims generally received and
respected.

Id. See also Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in
Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252 (2011).
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the primacy of state sovereignty.17 States are equal and must respect
each other’s sovereignty. The recognition of immunity of foreign
heads of state and its diplomats is recognized as a part of this respect.
In terms of traditional international law, internal sovereignty is
not limited.18 This becomes absurd; when dictators (say Assad)
massacre their people, it is an internal matter, but when their forces
injure members of other nationalities (say Turkish soldiers), it becomes
an international issue.19 Such situations have made Justice Antônio
Augusto Cançado Trindade criticize the established state of affairs as
a distortion of the original intent of the founders of international law.20
Nico Schrijver, The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty, 70 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.
65, 65 (1999).
18
Jens Bartelson, The Concept of Sovereignty Revisited, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 463
(2006);
17

All the contributors to this volume seem more or less painfully aware of
the tension that exists between the traditional view of sovereignty as an
indivisible and discrete condition of possible statehood, and the actual
dispersion of political power and legal authority to the sub- and
supranational levels. They are also very aware of the fact that whenever
the concept of sovereignty is simply redefined in order to be better attuned
to this dispersion of authority, a series of paradoxes arise that must be
resolved if those new constellations of power and authority are to be
perceived as legitimate.

Id. at 467.
19
Jost Delbrueck, International Protection of Human Rights and State Sovereignty,
57 IND. L.J. 567, 567 (1981) (“An impressive body of international conventions
providing for the protection of human rights in almost all spheres of social and
political life has been built up during the past fifty years,' but their enforcement is
sadly lagging. Sovereignty of states-understood as their supreme authority and
independence-is being identified as the major factor responsible for such a
lamentable state of affairs with regard to the internationally controlled
implementation of human rights.”).
20
See ANTÔNIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
HUMANKIND 10 (3d ed. 2010);
The universal jus gentium of Vitoria, remindful of the importance of
human solidarity, regulated, on the basis of principles of natural law and
right reason (recta ratio), the relations between all peoples, respectful of
their rights, the territories wherein they lived, and their contacts and
freedom of movement (jus communicationis). Deriving its strength from
principles of universal value, the jus gentium in the conception of Vitoria
applied equally to all, the governed and the governors. On the basis of
such conception the emerging international legal order purported to ensure
the primacy of law over force, as reflected in Vitoria’s famous warning
“Imperator non est dominus totus orbis. On his turn, Francisco Suárez,
warning that no State sufficed to itself, started likewise from the
fundamental unity of humankind (forming a societas ac communicatio),
and began to move towards the autonomy of the law of nations; such
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Over the years, attempts to change the traditional approach in
international law took place, including attempts to empower the
international court with universal jurisdiction. The attempts were to
introduce an international order that rests on principles of law, rather
than on a precarious balance of power, such as the equilibrium that the
Vienna Congress created.21 Henry Kissinger22 presents Woodrow
Wilson as the American president who has foreshadowed this
approach. In the Treaty of Versailles (1919),23 compensation was set
based on guilt, unlike the previous world order, in which the winners
simply forced the losers to pay compensation.24
The attempt to secure “collective security” through
international institutions failed between the two world wars.25 The
American president during the First World War, Woodrow Wilson,

autonomy was acknowledged by Hugo Grotius, who also admitted the
unity of the humankind and emphasized above all the role of reason. In
the work of A. Gentili, jus gentium was already regarded as the “common
law of humankind.” Much later on, with the contribution of the works of
Hugo Grotius and Christian Wolff, International Law was gradually to
achieve its autonomy vis-à-vis the national legal orders.

Id.
21
See Henry A. Kissinger, The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal, 8 WORLD POL.
264, 264 (1956).
22
HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 218 (1994).
23
Treaty of Versailles, 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at 43 (Charles I. Bevans ed., 1972),
available
at
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/lltreaties//lltreatiesustbv002/lltreaties-ustbv002.pdf.
24
Id.
25
See Joseph C. Ebegbulem, The Failure of Collective Security in the Post World
Wars I and II International System, 14 KHAZAR J. HUMANS. & SOC. SCIS. 29, 32
(2012) (“Another example of the failure of the League of Nations’ collective security
is the Manchurian crisis when Japan occupied part of China. After the invasion,
members of the League passed a resolution calling for Japan to withdraw or face
severe penalties. Given that every nation on the League of Nations Council had veto
power, Japan promptly vetoed the resolution, severely limiting the League of
Nations’ ability to respond. After two years of deliberation, the League passed a
resolution condemning the invasion without committing the League’s members to
any action against it. The Japanese replied by quitting the League of Nations. A
similar process occurred in 1935, when Italy invaded Ethiopia. Sanctions were
passed, but Italy would have vetoed any stronger resolution. Additionally, Britain
and France sought to court Italy’s government as a potential deterrent to Hitler, given
that Mussolini was not in what would become the Axis Alliance of World War II.
Thus, neither enforced any serious sanctions against the Italian government.”).
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failed to lead his own country to become a member of the League of
Nations.26
The Treaty of Versailles failed to propose a plan that might be
stable.27 John Maynard Keynes proposed a much better plan; he wrote
in his overlooked book, The Economic Consequences of the Peace:
If the General Election of December, 1918, had been
fought on lines of prudent generosity instead of
imbecile greed, how much better the financial prospect
of Europe might now be . . . I believe this to be an act
of generosity for which Europe can fairly ask, provided
Europe is making an honorable attempt in other
directions, not to continue war, economic or otherwise,
but to achieve the economic reconstitution of the whole
Continent.28
Later on, Keynes wrote:
Great Britain lives by commerce, and most Englishmen
now need but little persuading that she will gain more
in honor, prestige, and wealth by employing a prudent
generosity to preserve the equilibrium of commerce and
the well-being of Europe, than by attempting to exact a
hateful and crushing tribute, whether from her
victorious Allies or her defeated enemy. 29
As a replacement for effective enforcement measures (particularly
since U.S. Congress resisted the proposal that the U.S. will become a
Leroy G. Dorsey, Woodrow Wilson’s Fight for the League of Nations: A Reexamination,
2 RHETORIC & PUB. AFFS. 107, 107 (1999) (“In July 1919, Wilson pledged to establish
an organization of free nations working in concert to "maintain the peaceful
understandings of the world" through diplomacy and democracy, and not necessarily
through military might. When Congress balked at American participation in the
peace organization, one of the first of the modern rhetorical presidents embarked on
his famous ‘whistle-stop’ tour, stumping across the middle and western United States
to preach directly to the public about the issue. Wilson's tour, however, played out
as a Greek tragedy. His sermons about Americas moral responsibility failed to
generate the much-anticipated support in any substantive way. Wilson collapsed
from exhaustion before he had finished his speaking tour, suffered a stroke days later,
and was rendered incapacitated for several months.”).
27
See Kissinger, supra note 22, at 218.
28
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE 147,
272-73 (1920).
29
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A REVISION OF THE TREATY: BEING A SEQUEL TO THE
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE 77 (1922).
26
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member in the League of Nations), the new post-World War I world
order was to be secured primarily through public opinion.30 But public
opinion had failed to reach a new, stable world order. Only after World
War II, did a significant change in international law appear.31 Crimes
that were once deemed an internal affair are now considered a legal
matter for the whole international community to engage in.32
Half a century before World War II, Theodor Herzl argued that
anti-Semitism is not only the Jews’ problem, but also the problem of
the countries in which it occurs.33 Later, Martin Luther King adopted
this idea.34 In the words of the International Criminal Court’s
(hereinafter “ICC”) President:
30

Woodrow Wilson, President of the U.S., Address at the Third Plenary Session of
the Peace Conference in Paris, France (Feb. 14, 1919), available at
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-third-plenary-session-thepeace-conference-paris-france:
You will notice, that when a subject is submitted, not to arbitration, but to
discussion by the executive council, it can upon the initiative of either one
of the parties to the dispute be drawn out of the executive council onto the
larger forum of the general body of delegates, because throughout this
instrument we are depending primarily and chiefly upon one great force,
and that is the moral force of the public opinion of the world—the
cleansing and clarifying and compelling influences of publicity—so that
intrigues can no longer have their coverts, so that designs that are sinister
can at any time be drawn into the open, so that those things that are
destroyed by the light may be properly destroyed by the overwhelming
light of the universal expression of the condemnation of the world.

Id.
31
See Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and
Unintended Consequences, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 331(2009); “The emergence of
international criminal law is very special in post-World War II international law.”
Id. at 332.
32
Kofi A. Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 18, 1999),
available
at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/bbrown/classes/HumanrsemFall2008/CourseDocs/
12Twoconceptsofsovereignty-Kofi%20Annan.pdf (“State sovereignty, in its most
basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalisation and
international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at
the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual
sovereignty—by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual,
enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties—has been
enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we
read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect
individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.”).
33
JOSEPH AGASSI, LIBERAL NATIONALISM FOR ISRAEL: TOWARDS AN ISRAELI
NATIONAL IDENTITY 89-90 (1999).
34
Id.
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The vow requires the world to stand hard and resolute
against the danger of anti-Semitism and all other kinds
of racism and religious bigotry—which always carry in
their logic the associated risk of atrocity crimes
motivated by them. The ICC is a newfound global
instrument through which the world can take that
stand.35
From the perspective of the ICC the vow of ‘never
again’ is a shared responsibility regarding which the
ICC stands ready to play its part. That part requires the
ICC to put itself between the victims and the atrocities
that the world had in mind when creating the ICC—
even if this means brooking political attacks against the
Court itself.36

35

Reflections of the President of the ICC, Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji, on the 75th
Anniversary of Auschwitz Liberation: ‘Never Again’ Must Not Be a Meaningless
Mantra, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/reflections-president-icc-judge-chile-eboe-osuji-75thanniversary-auschwitz-liberation-never.
36
Id.
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In both the Nuremberg and the Tokyo trials, special international
tribunals judged German and Japanese suspects of war crimes.37 This
was criticized as “the justice of the victors,” 38 yet it prevailed.
Other changes also took place unplanned and with no debate in
any international forum. Israel set a precedent for universal
jurisdiction in its trial of Adolf Eichmann:39 a state’s authority to judge
horrific crimes, even if not committed in its land, and not even against
its citizens.40 Another change was the trial of retired Chilean dictator
37

Robert B. Walkinshaw, The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials: Another Step Toward
International Justice, 35 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 299, 299-302 (1949):
[T]he charter of the Tokyo tribunal. As early as 1944, there was set up at
Chungking the Far Eastern and Pacific Sub-Commission for War Crimes;
and the arrest of war criminals began as soon as the first American ships
came into Tokyo Bay. Some four months later, on January 19, 1946,
General MacArthur issued an order establishing the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, and published there with its charter which
conformed in essentials to the charter which has been attached to the
London Agreement. The legal basis, however, of the one tribunal was
different from that of the other. The tribunal of Nuremberg rested upon
an international agreement, but one to which Germany never became a
party. Its only signatories were Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France
and the United States . . . The tribunal for the Far East, on the other hand,
rested upon agreement with Japan. Paragraph 10 of the Potsdam
Declaration stated: We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved
as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to
all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our
prisoners. The reply thereto of August 10, 1945, stated: The Japanese
Government are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint
declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26, 1945 . . . Out of such
authority, General MacArthur, acting not as an Ameri can officer but as
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, set up the Military Tribunal
at Tokyo. As found by the United States Supreme Court, it too was a
purely international tribunal; it was no more a tribunal of the United States
than that of Nuremberg.

Id.
38
Victor Peskin, Beyond Victor's Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the Winners
at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 4 J.
HUM. RTS. 213, 213 (2005) (“For human rights advocates, the notion of ‘victor's
justice’ has become increasingly distasteful in the decades since Nuremberg.”).
39
See G.I.A.D. Draper, The Eichmann Trial: A Judicial Precedent, 38 INT’L AFFS.
(ROYAL INST. INT’L AFFS. 1944-) 485, 492-93 (1962). See also Itamar Mann, The
Dual Foundation of Universal Jurisdiction: Towards a Jurisprudence for the “Court
of Critique”, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 485, 489 (2010) (“The Eichmann trial
may have been the first United Nations-era assertion of universal jurisdiction, and
perhaps also the boldest one.”).
40
Roger O'Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 735, 746 (2004) (“In positive and slightly pedantic terms, universal
jurisdiction can be defined as prescriptive jurisdiction over offences committed
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Augusto Pinochet: a Spanish judge issued a warrant for his arrest while
he was visiting England—for alleged crimes that he had committed in
Chile during his reign there.41 Spain asked England to extradite him. 42
The precedent set by the House of Lords is that the former head of state
should be extradited in such a case, even though he eventually escaped
extradition on the excuse of a health condition.43 This was important
as it preceded the rejection of the excuse that as a head of state, he had
immunity against the extradition. 44 In the 1990s, the Security
Council—the legislative body in international law—established
special criminal tribunals for judging war crimes committed on former
Yugoslav land (“ICTY”) as well as on Rwandan land (“ICTR”). 45 The
next stage is the ICC.
According to the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC
depends on the consent of the states.46 On one hand, if a state accepts
the jurisdiction of the court, the court will have jurisdiction over it. On
the other hand, when a state accepts its jurisdiction, then the ICC has
jurisdiction to judge even war crimes that have been committed on its
territory, even by foreign forces.47 This means that if an invaded state
abroad by persons who at the time of commission are non-resident aliens, where such
offences are not deemed to constitute threats to the fundamental interests of the
prescribing state or, in appropriate cases, to give rise to effects within its territory.”).
41
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 311, 311 (2000).
42
Antoni Pigrau Sole, The Pinochet Case in Spain, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMPAR. L.
653, 653 (1999).
43
See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 41, at 312-13.
44
Id.
45
Barbora Hola et al., International Sentencing Facts and Figures: Sentencing
Practice at the ICTY and ICTR, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 411, 411 (2011).
46
In the case of Aggression, the default is that the consent of the two parties is
demanded. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [hereinafter Rome
Statute], Art. 15(4) (“The Court may, in accordance with article 12, exercise
jurisdiction over a crime of aggression, arising from an act of aggression committed
by a State Party, unless that State Party has previously declared that it does not accept
such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar. The withdrawal of such
a declaration may be effected at any time and shall be considered by the State Party
within three years.”); Rome Statute, Art. 15(5) (“In respect of a State that is not a
party to this Statute, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression when committed by that State’s nationals or on its territory.”).
47
Rome Statute, Art. 12 (2), https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf;
“In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction
if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3: (a) The State on the territory
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accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC, then the soldiers of the invading
state can be investigated and prosecuted although the latter has never
accepted the jurisdiction. Furthermore, according to the Rome
Statute,48 a state can accept the ICC’s jurisdiction with respect to
crimes that had been committed since the entry into force of the Rome
Statute, which was on July 1, 2002.49
III.

KISSINGER VERSUS KEYNES IN GAME THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVE

President Wilson had a very beautiful vision about
international relations, but his program was not founded on institutions
and incentives that would lead to its desirable aims. The international
order has been founded on moral values which he proposed that were
desirable but not stable. Let us define a new equilibrium that may help
us to choose games that lead to peace: a game is in peace equilibrium,
if and only if every player sees the strategy of respecting the peace as
superior to any strategy of going to war or threatening in war if the
status quo is not changed in their Favour. The problem with the Treaty
of Versailles was that it did not establish a peace equilibrium.50
John Maynard Keynes warned in real time from the danger of
the Treaty of Versailles. 51 Keynes even explained why people
supported the Treaty of Versailles: since people did not say in the
external circles what they said in the internal circles. In the game
theoretical language, when people say in the inner circles what they do

of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a
vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft.” Id.
48
UNITED NATIONS, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, SOC. JUST.
125-43 (1999).
49
Rome Statute, Art. 11, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf; “If a
State becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may exercise
its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this
Statute for that State, unless that State has made a declaration under article 12,
paragraph 3.” Id.
50
ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES 34 (1996) (arguing that “the Versailles
settlement could not possibly be the basis of a stable peace. It was doomed from the
start, and another war was practically certain.”).
51
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE XXV
(2017).
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not say in the external circle, there may be one Nash equilibrium 52 of
supporting one plan in the external circle, while a Nash equilibrium of
resisting the plan in the inner circle.53 Actually, the game may be
played twice with the same players: one time they declare their opinion
publicly, and in the other game they tell their opinions in the inner
circles, and we will get two dramatically different equilibria. It is the
phenomenon of double talk. Double talk prevents the opportunity to
get rid of mistakes: the criticism is said only in the internal circles and
saying it in the external circles is considered to be a disloyal step,
which incentivizes not to do it. This game may be prevented when
enough people have courage to speak openly or when society does not
See John F. Nash Jr., Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games, 36 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 48, 48-49 (1950) (a game is in Nash equilibrium if and only if no
player can benefit from unilaterally changing their strategy).
53
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A REVISION OF THE TREATY 4 (2020) (note that this is a
reproduction
of
the
original
from
1921),
available
at
https://books.google.co.il/books?id=YRDzDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PA4&ots=INH5bftD
RD&dq=For%20there%20are%2C%20in%20the%20present%20times%2C%20tw
o%20opinions%3B%20not%2C%20as%20in%20former%20ages%2C%20the%20t
rue%20and%20the%20false%2C%20but%20the%20outside%20and%20the%20ins
ide%3B%20the%20opinion%20of%20the%20public%20voiced%20by%20the%20
politicians%20and%20the%20newspapers%2C%20and%20the%20opinion%20of
%20the%20politicians%2C%20the%20journalists%20and%20the%20civil%20serv
ants%2C%20upstairs%20and%20backstairs%20and%20behind%E2%80%93stairs
%2C%20expressed%20in%20limited%20circles&pg=PA3#v=onepage&q&f=false
;
52

For there are, in the present times, two opinions; not, as in former ages,
the true and the false, but the outside and the inside; the opinion of the
public voiced by the politicians and the newspapers, and the opinion of
the politicians, the journalists and the civil servants, upstairs and
backstairs and behind–stairs, expressed in limited circles. In time of war
it became a patriotic duty that the two opinions should be as different as
possible; and some seem to think it so still . . . Those who live in the
limited circles and share the inside opinion pay both too much and too
little attention to the outside opinion; too much, because, ready in words
and promises to concede to it everything, they regard open opposition as
absurdly futile; too little, because they believe that these words and
promises are so certainly destined to change in due season, that it is
pedantic, tiresome, and inappropriate to analyze their literal meaning and
exact consequences. They know all this nearly as well as the critic, who
wastes, in their view, his time and his emotions in exciting himself too
much over what, on his own showing, cannot possibly happen.
Nevertheless, what is said before the world is, still, of deeper consequence
than the subterranean breathings and well–informed whisperings,
knowledge of which allows inside opinion to feel superior to outside
opinion, even at the moment of bowing to it.

Id.
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punish those who speak freely in the external circles. Keynes himself
was accused of loving Germans when he proposed the program that
could prevent the Second World War.
It should be said that there were attempts to correct the mistakes
of the Treaty of Versailles. However, the international community
preferred to be tough toward Germany in enforcing the obligations to
pay repression and to cancel their monarchic character, and very
flexible regarding Germany’s obligation not to strengthen its army and
war industry. This prevents a peace equilibrium, since it leads to a
combination of hostile feeling, incentives to violate international law,
and capacities to fight. Churchill preached the opposite and warned
against Great Britain’s priorities regarding which German obligation
to enforce.54 We will discuss later the mechanism established by the
Locarno Treaties, which followed the Treaty of Versailles.
Henry Kissinger presented President Theodore Roosevelt as
representing the opposite to Wilson. 55 The alternative approach of
54

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE GATHERING STORM (THE SECOND WORLD WAR) 1011 (1948);
The prejudice of the Americans against monarchy, which Mr. Lloyd
George made no attempt to counter-act, had made it clear to the beaten
Empire that it would have better treatment from the Allies as a republic
than as a monarchy. Wise policy would have crowned and fortified the
Weimar Republic with a constitutional sovereign in the person of an infant
grandson of the Kaiser, under a Council of Regency. Instead, a gaping
void was opened in the national life of the German people. All the strong
elements, military and feudal, which might have rallied to a constitutional
monarchy and for its sake respected and sustained the new democratic and
Parliamentary processes were for the time being unhinged. The Weimar
Republic, with all its liberal trappings and blessings, was regarded as an
imposition of the enemy. It could not hold the loyalties or the imagination
of the German people . . . Poincare, the strongest figure who succeeded
Clemenceau, attempted to make an independent Rhineland under the
patron- age and control of France. This had no chance of success. He did
not hesitate to try to enforce reparations on Germany by the invasion of
the Ruhr. This certainly imposed compliance with the Treaties on
Germany; but it was severely condemned by British and American
opinion. As a result of the general financial and political disorganisation
of Germany, together with reparation payments during the years 1919 to
1923, the mark rapidly col- lapsed. The rage aroused in Germany by the
French occupation of the Ruhr led to a vast, reckless printing of paper
notes with the deliberate object of destroying the whole basis of the
currency. In the final stages of the inflation the mark stood at forty-three
million millions to the pound sterling. The social and economic
consequences of this inflation were deadly and far-reaching.

Id.
55
Kissinger, supra note 22, at 29.
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“balance of powers,”56 as advocated by President Theodore Roosevelt,
is not just; and it may be destabilized when the balance of power is
changed; and it also encourages arms races. 57 Moreover, if the world
order is based on an aristocratic approach such that one state will
oblige to help the attacked state, the stability of peace is dependent on
the belief of the potential aggressor that the obliging state will fulfil its
obligation to protect the attacked state. Even if the obliged state
intends to fulfil its obligation, the potential aggressor may misread its
intention, and its mistake may lead to war. It should be clarified that
there is a big difference between the Realpolitik approach and the
aristocratic balance of powers approach, since realpolitik does not take
obligation seriously, and thus does not take seriously defined alliances
such as NATO. The balance of power approach proposes to stabilize
the world by treaties, that make it irrational to go to war. The
Realpolitik does not take the treaties seriously, since they claim that
treaties cannot lead one country to protect another county.58 They
argue that one country will protect another country if and only if it is
in their best interest regardless of the treaty, so a treaty cannot make
any difference.59 The aristocrat may see the “honour” as a sufficient
mechanism to enforce a treaty. This is why Chamberlain relied on
Hitler in the Munich Agreement;60 he thought that Hitler was a
gentleman who would keep his word.61 We say: game theory, and
particularly the game theoretical distinction of one-time game from
repeat game, teaches us that treaties are much more than papers; they

56

Id.
Id.
58
Uri Weiss & Joseph Agassi, Game Theory for International Accords, 16 S.C.J
INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 1 (2019).
59
See Hobbes, supra note 2. The Realpolitik actually followed Hobbes who claimed,
“Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at
all. Therefore, notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, (which every one hath then
kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no
Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully
rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men.” Id.
60
PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES: CLUES TO DECEIT IN THE MARKETPLACE, POLITICS,
AND MARRIAGE 15-16 (21st ed. 1985) (“Defending his policies against those who
doubt Hitler's word, Chamberlain . . . in a speech to Parliament explains that his
personal contact with Hitler allows him to say that Hitler ‘means what he says.’”).
61
Id. (“After his meeting with Hitler, Chamberlain writes to his sister. . . in spite of
the hardness and ruthlessness I thought I saw in his face, I got the impression that
here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word . . . .).
57
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change the incentives.62 However, game theory also teaches us that in
order to have a peace, a peace equilibrium treaty may not be
sufficient.63
An example of the aristocratic way to organize the world was
the Locarno Treaties.64 Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy and
France obliged not to attack each other, and that if one country invades
the other without justification, the rest will protect the other.65 It
should be noted that the Locarno Treaties did not include a parallel
obligation to protect the borders in eastern Europe. In the end, World
War II erupted after Germany did not respect the borders regarding
Eastern Europe. Germany even blamed France for violating the
Locarno Treaties, while entering a defined alliance with the U.S.S.R.66
The Locarno Treaties represent an aristocratic ethos that five
countries will be honest regarding each other.67 However, it is not
62

Uri Weiss & Joseph Agassi, Game Theory for International Accords, 16 S.C. J.
INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 1 (2019).
63
Id.
64
Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, art. 16, Oct. 16, 1925, available at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2054/volume-I-1292English.pdf (Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, done at Locarno, Oct. 16, 1925, Final
Protocol of the Locarno Conference of the same Date and Collective Note to
Germany dated London, Dec. 1, 1925, regarding Article 16 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations).
65
See Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, supra note 64, at art. 4(3);
In case of a flagrant violation of Article 2 of the present Treaty or of a
flagrant breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by one of
the High Contracting Parties, each of the other Contracting Parties hereby
undertakes immediately to come to the help of the Party against whom
such a violation or breach has been directed as soon as the said Power has
been able to satisfy itself that this violation constitutes an unprovoked act
of aggression and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of
the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the
demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary. Nevertheless, the
Council of the League of Nations, which will be seized of the question in
accordance with the first paragraph of this Article, will issue its findings,
and the High Contracting Parties undertake to act in accordance with the
recommendations of the Council, provided that they are concurred in by
all the Members other than the representatives of the Parties which have
engaged in hostilities.

Id.
66
S.A.H., Note on the Franco-Soviet Pact and the Locarno Treaty, 12 BULL. INT’L
NEWS 8 (1936).
67
Julian Lindley-French, In the Shade of Locarno? Why European Defence is
Failing, 78 INT’L AFFAIRS 789, 789-811 (2002) (“a complex interplay between the
traditional balance of power approach to security and the collective security,
disarmament and international arbitration enshrined in the Treaty of Versailles
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enough that they will be honest regarding each other, but the honesty
should be expanded to a general honesty, at least to a minimal general
honesty. This example represents the instability of partial honesty (this
is a proposal for a democratization of the aristocratic values). This
example also illustrates the advantage of Keynes not only on the Treaty
of Versailles, but also regarding Locarno Treaties.68 Keynes proposed
a solution based on generosity.69 One of the advantages of generosity
over honesty is that partial generosity may be enough where partial
honesty is not enough, and every honesty or generosity is always
partial. If states intend to be generous toward each other they will be
at least honest, while if they intend to be honest, they may fail. In the
Jewish law, some rabbis demanded more than they believe the Torah
commanded “in order to keep a man far from transgression.”70 Let us
say: generosity keeps a state far from transgression; it is like taking a
security range. Moreover, since there may be sincere disputes about
what is fair, it is not enough that countries will decide to adopt a policy
of honesty. This is particularly valid when there is no consented court
to decide what honesty commands. Thus, contrary to Realpolitik, we
propose that the solution to the absence of enforcement mechanisms in
international law is the combination of conditional generosity and the
choice to be subject to international law and to the international court
regardless of the choice of the other side. We argue that it is in the best
interest of each country to adopt such a policy since by this they choose
resulted in strategic paralysis. The nadir of this failed strategic concept was the
Treaty of Locarno in 1925 that, by endeavouring to keep all states happy at all times,
simply prevented the creation of an effective security and defence mechanism.”).
68
See Churchill, supra note 54, at 28;
The pact of Locarno was concerned only with peace in the West, and it
was hoped that what was called an “Eastern Locarno” might be its
successor. We should have been very glad if the danger of some future
war between Germany and Russia could have been controlled in the same
spirit and by similar measures as the possibility of war between Germany
and France. Even the Germany of Stresemann was however disinclined
to close the door on German claims in the East, or to accept the territorial
treaty position about Poland, Danzig, the Corridor, and Upper Silesia.
Soviet Russia brooded in her isolation behind the Cordon Sanitaire of antiBolshevik States. Although our efforts were continued, no progress was
made in the East. I did not at any time close my mind to an attempt to
give Germany greater satisfaction on her eastern frontier. But no
opportunity arose during these brief years of hope.

Id.
69
See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE 102,
164 (1920).
70
Mishnah Berakhot 1:1.
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better games. It is much cheaper to be conditionally generous than to
prepare for war, and commitment to international law incentivizes the
other side to prepare much less to a war against you, and that the policy
of respecting international law should not be dependent on the choice
of the other player. Unilateral acceptance of international law is
sufficient to lead to a huge improvement in the security of the state. 71
71

Aumann should be praised for his proposal to use game theory in order to compare
between the Isaiah game and the Roman game, and we praise him despite coming to
different conclusions from this comparison. Before his Nobel lecture, Aumann gave
a public pilot lecture in the Rationality Center, that sparked an extremely interesting
(and critical) discussion. He claimed that his vision teaches that the vision of Isaiah
cannot be an equilibrium, since according to this vision people do not prepare for
wars. However, in such a case one player changes their strategy to prepare for war
in order to occupy. Aumann erred in his pilot lecture since according to this vision,
there is an international court. Fortunately, in the prize lecture itself Aumann
changed his mind and wrote:
We end with a passage from the prophet Isaiah (2, 2–4): “And it shall
come to pass . . . that . . . many people shall go and say, . . . let us go up to
the mountain of the Lord, . . . and He will teach us of His ways, and we
will walk in His paths. . . . And He shall judge among the nations, and
shall rebuke many people; and they shall beat their swords into
ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up
sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.” Isaiah is
saying that the nations can beat their swords into ploughshares when there
is a central government–a Lord, recognized by all. In the absence of that,
one can perhaps have peace–no nation lifting up its sword against another.
But the swords must continue to be there–they cannot be beaten into
ploughshares–and the nations must continue to learn war, in order not to
fight!

Robert J. Aumann, War and Peace, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 17075,
17078 (2006). It is a huge improvement, but Aumann erred in the choice of the game
and in missing the option to play unilaterally the game of international law. The
example of the EU challenges the thesis of Aumann, since in the EU it seems that
there is an equilibrium in which no country will attempt to occupy the other country
even if their victory is assured. Aumann ignores cases of countries that prefer not to
occupy even when its victory is assured. See Uri Weiss & Joseph Agassi, The Game
Theory of the European Union versus the Pax Romana, 70 DEPAUL L. REV. 551
(2020). Moreover, a state may adopt unilaterally a policy of respecting international
law, and by this reducing dramatically the incentive to be armed against them.
Instead of using the vision of Isaiah in order to study how to change the game in
order to have more peace and a significant disarming, Aumann used the vision in
order to explain why to arm when we do not play the game of Isaiah. The mistake
of Aumann is first of all in the choice of the game: Aumann recommended to play
the Roman strategy, based on the argument that we do not play the Isaiah game so a
country should not play unilaterally the Isaiah game, instead of asking how to play a
game that will be closer to the Isaiah game, in which an international law discourages
arming. We argue that it may be done by a country’s unilateral choice to respect
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Let us now combine the above-mentioned criticism of the
policy toward Germany between the two world wars: the alternative of
Keynes that presented a solution of conditional generosity. Instead of
this, a solution of partial-honesty was chosen, i.e., a solution in which
the security of five countries is guaranteed, but not the security of the
other countries in Europe. The Treaty of Versailles did not establish
equilibrium, since given the lack of enforcement mechanism the
Germans did not see it in their best interest to respect the Treaty of
Versailles, particularly since the Treaty of Versailles also created
hostile feelings.72 The policy of what to enforce and what not to
enforce strengthened the incentive of Germany to go to war, since it
incentivized Germany to develop its military industry. The solution of
Locarno was insufficient in order to prevent wars; it represented partial
honesty, since the eastern part of Europe was not protected effectively
by the treaty, and in the end the war erupted after Germany invaded
this part of Europe. The Treaties of Locarno may have misled
Germany to believe that the Western European countries will contain
their occupations in the Eastern Europe parts.
We propose that the right attitude is to ask how to establish a
peace equilibrium that leads to minimal injustice. This attitude
international law. Unilateral acceptance is sufficient in order to lead to a huge
improvement in the security of both sides, and when enough countries accept it, we
may move from playing the game of old Europe to playing the game of the European
Union. We praise Aumann for his comparison between the Jewish game of peace
and the Roman game of peace, yet Aumann erred that the Romans are right when we
do not have a central government. We do not only have different recommendation
from those of Aumann, but also a different methodology: Aumann adopts the
tradition of Von Neumann and Morgenstern to take the game as given, while we first
of all attempt to prevent the bad games, including by unilateral choice of the game.
72
Der Spiegel, Henry Kissinger Interview with Der Spiegel,
HENRYAKISSINGER.COM
(July
6,
2009),
https://www.henryakissinger.com/interviews/henry-kissinger-interview-with-derspiegel/.
Any international system must have two key elements for it to work. One,
it has to have a certain equilibrium of power that makes overthrowing the
system difficult and costly. Secondly, it has to have a sense of legitimacy.
That means that the majority of the states must believe that the settlement
is essentially just. Versailles failed on both grounds. The Versailles
meetings excluded the two largest continental powers: Germany and
Russia. If one imagines that an international system had to be preserved
against a disaffected defector, the possibility of achieving a balance of
power within it was inherently weak. Therefore, it lacked both
equilibrium and a sense of legitimacy.

Id.
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synthesizes the two alternatives: it tries to achieve the goal of
minimizing global injustice but recognizes the need to create powers,
namely, institutions, that make this goal possible, namely, that achieve
peace equilibrium.
While Realpolitik is blind to justice in the name of stability, we
say that there is no zero-sum game between justice and stability.
Reducing injustice changes the preferences and even incentives in a
way that may strengthen stability. Kissinger is right in his criticism
against Treaty of Versailles; however, Kissinger sees the Realpolitik
as the right substitute to the Treaty of Versailles, while we see Keynes’
plan as the right substitute for the Treaty of Versailles, namely, peace
that is based not on a policy of generosity. Thus, we strongly disagree
with Kissinger and Aumann (although our project studies a lot from
both of them), and adopt Keynes; thus, we reject the models of Vienna
Congress and the Pax Romana and support the model of the EU.
Keynes proposed an aristocratic solution that is based on generosity,
while Kissinger who admires the solution of Vienna’s Congress
supports conservative Prussic aristocracy.73
Let us mention another better alternative to the the Realpolitik.
In his “Sinews of peace” speech Churchill made this point:
If we adhere faithfully to the Charter of the United
Nations and walk forward in sedate and sober strength
seeking no one’s land or treasure, seeking to lay no
arbitrary control upon the thoughts of men; if all British
moral and material forces and convictions are joined
with your own in fraternal association, the high-roads
of the future will be clear, not only for us but for all, not
only for our time, but for a century to come. 74
73

Henry A. Kissinger, The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal, 8 WORLD POL. 264,
264-80 (1956) (“It is only natural that a period anxiously seeking to wrest peace from
the threat of nuclear extinction should look nostalgically to the last great successful
effort to settle international disputes by means of a diplomatic conference, the
Congress of Vienna. Nothing is more tempting than to ascribe its achievements to
the very process of negotiation, to diplomatic skill, and to ‘willingness to come to an
agreement’—and nothing is more dangerous. For the effectiveness of diplomacy
depends on elements transcending it; in part on the domestic structure of the states
comprising the international order, in part on their power relationship.”).
74
Winston Churchill, The Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain Speech), AMERICA’S
NATIONAL CHURCHILL MUSEUM,
history.html#:~:text=On%20March%205%2C%201946%2C%20the,%22The%20S
inews%20of%20Peace.%22 (last visited Aug. 12, 2022).
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By this he proposed to accept unliterally international law. The
strategy of Churchill to “adhere faithfully to the Charter of the United
Nations”75 is his advantage on the strategy of the Pax Romana: “[i]f
you want peace, prepare for war,” and on strategies that attempt to
follow the Pax Romana, such as the strategy of Aumann.76 This is how
Thomas Willing Balch characterized the relationship of the Romans
regarding international law, “[t]he Greeks made some attempts at
arbitration among themselves, notably in an agreement between the
Lacedaemonians and the Argives. But with the ‘barbarians’ who
formed the rest of the world, the Greeks, apparently, would not
arbitrate. For a long time the Romans as the masters of the world
maintained peace by force of arms but not by arbitration.” 77 Contrary
to the vision of the Pax Romana, that is glorified by Aumann, 78
75

Id.
See Yisrael Aumann, Israel70: Yisrael Aumann on gaming Israel’s Future,
FATHOM (Mar. 2018), https://fathomjournal.org/israel70-yisrael-aumann-ongaming-israels-future/
76

Why do the Swiss need fighter planes if they’ve been at peace for so
long?’ I responded that that’s exactly why! They have peace because they
are strong. The runners-up to the Swiss are the Romans, who had a Pax
Romana which lasted for about 230 years and who had a maxim: ‘If you
want peace, prepare for war.’ Yet while Israel does prepare for war, it’s
not getting peace. That’s because while we may be preparing for war in
hardware–investing in the tools of war such as tanks, missiles, ground
forces and drones, we are failing to prepare for war in software–deep
down in our hearts. To fully follow the Roman axiom, a country has to
feel deep down that it is ready to fight. But our heart isn’t fully in it.

Id.
77
Thomas Willing Balch, The Proposed International Tribunal of Arbitration of
1623, 46 PROCS. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 302, 302-11 (1907).
78
Steve Lind, Nobel Advice: Israeli Strength and Peace, According to Prof. Yisrael
Aumann, JERUSALEM POST (July 28, 2018 13:35), https://www.jpost.com/jerusalemreport/novel-advice-israel-strength-and-peace-according-to-prof-aumann-563395;
Aumann explained his view in an interview:
There was the Pax Romana, which lasted well over 200 years. It kept the
whole Western world at peace. How did they do it? Now, I don’t like the
Romans, OK? They destroyed the Temple and they were cruel people,
but they kept the peace, and if you want peace, you have to look at what
they did. The motto on my blackboard, “Si vis pacem, para bellum”
means “If you want peace, prepare for war.” That’s a Roman proverb,
OK, and people don’t understand that. You know, I was at a conference
of sorts of a medical unit of the IDF, and someone said, “We never come
up with this. We don’t have to deal with this because it never happens.”
But I say (he raises his voice), “You have to deal with it in order to keep
it from happening!

Id.
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Churchill recommends being prepared for war, but also respecting
unilaterally international law.79
Let us now compare what lesson Aumann and Churchill
studied to form the absence of mechanism to enforce international law.
Aumann claimed, in his Nobel lecture,
Isaiah is saying that the nations can beat their swords
into ploughshares when there is a central government–
a Lord, recognized by all. In the absence of that, one
can perhaps have peace–no nation lifting up its sword
against another. But the swords must continue to be
there—they cannot be beaten into ploughshares—and
the nations must continue to learn war, in order not to
fight!80
Contrary to him, Churchill claimed:
I have, however, a definite and practical proposal to
make for action. Courts and magistrates may be set up
but they cannot function without sheriffs and
constables. The United Nations Organisation must
immediately begin to be equipped with an international
armed force. In such a matter we can only go step by
step, but we must begin now. I propose that each of the
Powers and States should be invited to delegate a
certain number of air squadrons to the service of the
world organization . . . I wished to see this done after
the First World War, and I devoutly trust it may be done
forthwith.81
Let us comment on the difference: Aumann takes the international
game as given and recommends what strategy to take in this game,
while Churchill recommends changing the game to be more peaceful
one.
See id. He claimed: “From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies
during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength,
and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially
military weakness.” Id.
80
Aumann, supra note 71, at 17078.
81
Winston Churchill, The Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain Speech), AMERICA’S
NATIONAL CHURCHILL MUSEUM,
history.html#:~:text=On%20March%205%2C%201946%2C%20the,%22The%20S
inews%20of%20Peace.%22 (last visited Aug. 12, 2022).
79
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Let us note also some other international relations’ policies that
should be rejected: the solution of George W. Bush (before September
11, 2001), to the fiasco of Israel and Palestine to achieve peace
agreement, was “let them bleed.” 82 In other words, Bush proposed the
parties to fight and then to discover the balance of powers between
them. This solution illustrates the disadvantages of Realpolitik:
sometimes the balance of powers is unclear, and this may lead
negotiations to fail without having an option of solution by
adjudication. Meanwhile the parties may develop a more hostile
feeling that makes the solution much more difficult; even if they
corrected their mistakes regarding their balance of power before the
last fight between them, it does not mean that they know what their
current balance of powers is. The country that wins the former war
may be over optimistic regarding the result of the next war, which
makes it more difficult to prevent the next war. Bush changed his
policy after September 11, 2001; however, his wars in the name of
justice, democracy and human rights did not lead to democracy but to
the raising of ISIS.83 Bush was right that democratization may lead to
much more security; however, he was wrong in believing that the right
way to spark democracy is by wars. It was much cheaper for the U.S.
to promote democracy in the Middle East by Keynes’ style solution: to
invest in education, development and subsidizing peace agreements.
The tragedy of rejecting the proposal of Keynes has repeated again and
again, and we try to develop his theory and propose a combination of
respecting international law and generosity.
IV.

FROM NEGOTIATION TO LITIGATION IN PEACE PROCESSES

We argue, here, that a shift from a game of international
negotiation in the shadow of the war (a realist negotiation) to a game
of international negotiation in the shadow of the law will have three
main effects: a distributive effect, an effect of reducing the incentive
to arm and terrorize, and increasing the likelihood of peace.
82

See Lev Grinberg, The Busharon Global War, FPIF.ORG (July 8, 2002),
https://fpif.org/the_busharon_global_war/. See also Aluf Benn, Bush’s Middle East
Band-Aid,
SALON.COM
(Mar.
22,
2002
8:23
PM
EST),
https://www.salon.com/2002/03/22/peace_8/.
83
Hassan Hassan, The True Origins of ISIS, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 30, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/isis-origins-anbarizarqawi/577030/ (“Most historians of the Islamic State agree that the group emerged
out of al-Qaeda in Iraq as a response to the U.S. invasion in 2003.”).
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First, this shift has a distributive effect. While in the
negotiation mechanism, the settlement will be a function of Force, in
the litigation mechanism, it will be a function of Law. Second, the
shift from negotiation to litigation influences the incentives,
particularly this shift reduces the incentive to pursue terrorism. Third,
the shift from negotiation in the shadow of the war to a negotiation in
the shadow of international law increases our likelihood to reach
agreement. In the negotiation mechanism there are possible obstacles
("market failures'')84 in our way to achieve a settlement.
The shift from a negotiation in the shadow of the war to a
negotiation in the shadow of international law may happen in two main
ways: the first way is by establishing an international court with
universal jurisdiction and an enforcement mechanism. According to
the vision of the U.N. Charter:
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by
negotiation,
enquiry,
mediation,
conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of
their own choice. The Security Council shall, when it
deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their
dispute by such means.85
In making recommendations under this Article the
Security Council should also take into consideration
that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred
by the parties to the International Court of Justice in
accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the
Court.86
The vision of the UN charter is legally strengthened by the Rome
Statute, in which it is sufficient that either the invading country or the
invaded country will be a member in order that the court will have
jurisdiction regarding war crimes, crimes against humanity and the
See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970); See also Branislav L. Slantchev &
Ahmer Tarar, Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War, 55 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 135 (2011).
85
U.N. Charter art. 33.
86
U.N. Charter art. 36(3).
84
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crime of genocide, but regarding aggression usually the consent of
both sides is needed (the crime of Aggression limits the right of a
country to go to war, to impose a blockade or an occupation regime, or
to annex a territory).87 The Rome Statute establishes an international
criminal court that may impose an individual responsibility and may
also oblige to pay reparations.88
The second way to shift from a negotiation in the shadow of
the war to a negotiation in the shadow of international law is by a
state’s choice to subject itself unilaterally to international law.89 Many
countries prefer to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice and the International Criminal Court; this helps those countries
to enjoy peace. The statute of the international court of justice
determines:
The states parties to the present Statute may at any time
declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement, in relation to any other
state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of
the Court in all legal disputes concerning: the
interpretation of a treaty; any question of international
law; the existence of any fact which, if established,
would constitute a breach of an international obligation;

87

See
Rome
Statute,
art.
51,
https://legal.un.org/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf
Statute]:

available
[hereinafter

at
Rome

Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court The jurisdiction of the Court
shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this
Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression.

Id.
88
See Rome Statute, supra note 87, at art. 258 (“[1] The Court shall have jurisdiction
over natural persons pursuant to this Statute. [2] A person who commits a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for
punishment in accordance with this Statute.”).
89
It is interesting that the international law enables unilateral declarations and
obligation: “Any State possesses capacity to undertake legal obligations through
unilateral declarations.” Int’l Law Comm’n, Guiding Principles Applicable to
Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations (2006),
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_9_2006.pdf; See
also Alfred P. Rubin, The International Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations, 71
AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1-30 (1977).
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the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation. 90
Seventy-three states chose to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court.91
Each State which has recognized the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court has in principle the right to
bring any one or more other States, which have
accepted the same obligation, before the Court, by
filing an application instituting proceeding with the
Court. Conversely, it undertakes to appear before the
Court should proceedings be instituted against it by one
or more other such States.92
Realpolitik ignores that there are states which choose voluntarily to be
subject to international law.93 Realpolitik sees the obligation to
international law as no more than beautiful empty words, since the
court has no mechanism to enforce its decisions.94 Realpolitik's
supporters ignore that even when the courts have no mechanism to

90

Statute of the International Court of Justice, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,
(2017), https://www.icj-cij.org/en/basis-of-jurisdiction.
91
International Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the
Court as Compulsory, ICJ-CIJ.ORG, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations (last
visited Aug. 12, 2022).
92
International Court of Justice, supra note 91.
93
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 225
(2005) (“International law is a real phenomenon, but international law scholars
exaggerate its power and significance. We have argued that the best explanation for
when and why states comply with international law is not that states have internalized
international law, or have a habit of complying with it, or are drawn by its moral pull,
but simply that states act out of self-interest.”).
94
Shirley V. Scott, Is There Room for International Law in Realpolitik?: Accounting
for the US ‘Attitude’ Towards International Law, 30 REV. INT’L STUD. 71, 73 (2004)
(“There is as yet no coherent theoretical explanation of the phenomenon that is able
to reconcile the apparent discrepancy between the support that the United States
showed for the system of international law in the immediate post-World War II years
and the recent actions/inactions with which observers take issue. Realism, which has
been the dominant paradigm in International Relations in the post-World War II era,
has scant regard for international law. And yet this article suggests, somewhat
counter-intuitively, that the most fundamental tenets of realism regarding state
behaviour can in fact well account for US behaviour in relation to international law;
the identified ‘attitude’ of the United States towards international law would appear
to have been integral to the hegemonic rise of the United States.”).
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enforce their decisions, the decisions and potential decisions matter. 95
Other realists will say that it is because such countries have peace.
They ignore that those countries enjoy peace since they accept
international law. They ignore that while a country commits itself to
respect the legal rights of the other country/people, they reduce the
incentive to arm against them. Moreover, when a criminal state makes
a concession, they always fear that it encourages terrorism; they ignore
that what encourages terrorism is that they are ready to make a
concession if and only if the other party strikes them.
Robert J. Aumann used to give the example of the Israeli
withdrawal from Gaza;96 he claims that it led to extreme violence,
since it was in response to attacks against Israel. 97 Aumann is right
that the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza had an effect of incentivizing
terrorism. However, Aumann dismisses that it is because Israel
adopted a policy of not respecting international law unless the victim
of Israel’s international law violation leads Israel to say to themselves
that the price for the violation will be high enough, and this is even if
the price is illegal violence by the victim. He further dismissed that if
95

See Shai Dothan, How International Courts Enhance Their Legitimacy, 14
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 455, 455-78 (2013). Dothan argues that international
courts interact with states under their jurisdiction and with their national courts. Id.
International courts try to preserve their legitimacy vis-à-vis states; at the same time,
they want to signal that states will comply with them even if they issue judgments
states disagree with. Id. International courts can cooperate with national courts and
gain legitimacy from interacting with legitimate national courts. Id. The norms that
international courts apply constrain their ability to maneuver their judgments in ways
that can help their legitimacy, but at the same time help legitimize their judgments.
Id. International courts use various tactics to shape their reasoning in order to
improve their legitimacy. Id.
96
Amanda Borschel-Dan, Israeli-Palestinian Peace a Matter of Incentives, says
Nobel Laureate Aumann, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL (Dec. 13, 2018, 4:05 PM)
https://www.timesofisrael.com/mideast-peace-a-matter-of-incentives-says-nobellaureate-aumann/ (Aumann claimed: Everybody wants peace in the Middle East, said
Aumann; however, proclaiming that desire may actually drive the fulfilment of it
farther away. This applies, too, to any “concessions,” such as the 2005
Disengagement from Gaza, in which Israel unilaterally pulled its settlers and troops
from the region, which quickly became a stronghold for the terrorist organization
Hamas. “When you shout, ‘peace, peace, peace,’ then it’s a signal [to the adversary]
to up the price,” said Aumann. “The expulsion from Gaza—ancient history—was a
very very bad move,” he said, and taught the Palestinians that if they put on enough
pressure, Israel will capitulate. “We are giving them incentives to press on.”).
97
Lee Smith, Wrong Move, TABLET MAG. (Sept. 22, 2010),
https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/israel-middle-east/articles/wrong-move.
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Israel withdrew from occupied territories as a step of regret on the
criminal settlements and as a credible choice to respect the rights of
the Palestinians, then these incentives would have never existed.
We will illustrate the mistaken approach of Aumann by this
example: Aumann should be praised for publicly correcting his
mistake and recognizing the Israeli occupation.98 However, we
wonder why it did not lead him to change his mind regarding the
Palestinians’ rights, and his support of the settlements in the occupied
territories. Thus, adopting the views of Aumann will encourage
terrorism, since for Aumann international law is not a sufficient reason
for avoiding establishing settlements in occupied territories, although
it is clearly forbidden. By his support of the Israeli settlements,
Aumann signals to the Palestinians: your international legal rights, or
at least your international legal rights in eye of the majority of
international lawyers, are not a strong enough reason for me to respect
them. Thus, the conclusion is that Aumann unintentionally proposes
to create a game in which every concession for peace is an incentive to
terrorism. This is so since the other side does not see the concession
as a choice to respect its international legal rights or as an expression
of generosity or peace-loving, but as a capitulation to violence; and
Aumann criticizes every such concession to peace as an incentive to
terrorism, and by this combination Aumann unintentionally blocks the
game of negotiation without threats to use force.

98

Israeli Nobel Laureate: We Should Annex Now, Not 'Talk It To Death', JERUSALEM
POST (June 6, 2020 8:33 A.M.), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/professoraumann-we-should-annex-now-not-talk-it-to-death-630494.
I used to be upset when people would talk about “the occupation.” It’s
our country, which we’re willing to share with the Arabs, so why do they
call it “occupation?” But a while ago, not too long ago, I changed my
mind. It is an occupation. We have a military government in Judea and
Samaria.

Id.
There’s been a military government for 51 years now. If you have a
military government, then you have an occupation. That’s what an
occupation means. I think if we want peace, we have to end the
occupation. What do you mean by that? What do I mean by ending the
occupation? I mean that we belong there, but there has to be some kind
of application of Israeli law in Judea and Samaria. Area C is very large,
comparatively. It’s not as big as Siberia, but it’s quite large and there’s
lots of empty land and lots of Jewish communities there. I think we should
go ahead, take the initiative and annex large tracts of Area C.

Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss3/7

30

Weiss and Agassi: Playing the Game of International Law

2022

PLAYING THE GAME OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

923

In the game created by Aumann, it is impossible to have peace
without giving a signal of capitulating to violence, and since Aumann
resists any capitulating to violence, and resists respecting the
international legal rights of the other, his strategy is one that makes
peace impossible. Thus, Aumann’s recommendations create a game
similar to zero-sum game, in which agreements are impossible. This
usage of game theory dismisses all the achievements of modern
economic theory, particularly that trade is for the benefit of the two
players and hence we should not interrupt trade.99
We criticize Aumann for not resisting the settlements although
he recognized the occupation. Aumann misses that this policy
incentivized terrorism. We argue that the policy of denying the
occupation also incentivized terrorism. The Israeli Prime Minister,
Ariel Sharon, resisted saying why he chose to withdraw from Gaza.100
In an extremely rare moment, he said: “[o]ccupation is bad.” 101
Immediately, the Israeli Chief Attorney, Eliakim Rubinstein, said to
him, “[d]o not say occupation,”102 since his use of the word could
weaken Israel’s position in negotiations.103 By this, Rubinstein
encouraged terrorism; he wished to block any Israeli acknowledgment
of the occupation, since he denied the illegality of the Israeli
settlements in the occupied territories. Consequently, the Israeli legal
system prevents Israel from making concession based on international
law, and by this they encourage terrorism; it sabotages the security of
Israel by denying that the Palestinians have rights of occupied people
in the occupied territories; the Israeli legal system makes respecting
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1st ed., 1776). “[T]rade which, without
force or constraint, is naturally and regularly carried on between any two places, is
always advantageous, though not always equally.” Id. at Book IV, ch. III, § II. When
a state is committed to international law it is much easier for the state to play the
game of bargaining without force or constraint that Smith recommends. Id.
100
Yael S. Aronoff, From Warfare to Withdrawal: The Legacy of Ariel Sharon, 15 ISRAEL
STUD. 149, 149-72 (2010) (“Sharon explained that he was pursuing his plan because
‘a situation has been created in which it is possible to do the things I want and to get
an American commitment.”).
101
AP Archive, Israeli PM Says Occupation is Bad for Us and Them, YOUTUBE,
(July 23, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fzlkrAfxBs. See also Kelly
Wallace, Sharon: 'Occupation' Terrible for Israel, Palestinians, CNN (May 27,
2003), https://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/05/26/mideast/.
102
Rebecca Trounsan & Megan K. Stack, Sharon Says ‘Occupation’ Not What He
Meant, LA TIMES (May 28, 2003), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003may-28-fg-mideast28-story.html.
103
Id.
99
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international law to be a submission to violence, and by this
encouraging violence. The Israeli legal system forces Israel to play a
game of a choice between encouraging terrorism by not respecting
international law, or encouraging terrorism by respecting international
law, which is a surrender to terrorism in the eyes of the Israelis who do
not recognize the Palestinians’ rights. Israel pays an enormous price
for its institutional lies regarding the non-existence of the occupation.
The choice to lie and deny the Palestinians' rights forces Israel to play
a risky game, in which it is impossible to allocate the rights peacefully.
It is the complex of the Macho, that occupying countries may
suffer from the Macho’s roll when they have the power. They
necessarily make mistakes in their calculation, but they cannot correct
their mistakes, since it will be a capitulation to terrorism. We say that
respecting international law is the right way to discourage terrorism.
Honesty is the minimal demand and respecting international law is the
minimal demand for a state to be honest. The better strategy
recommended by Keynes is the strategy of generosity.104 We
recommend this international relations’ strategy: being always honest
and being conditionally generous.
V.

REALIST NEGOTIATION VERSUS NEGOTIATION IN THE
SHADOW OF THE LAW

According to the traditional view, international conflicts
should be solved via a mechanism of negotiation.105 This means that
the conflict should be solved via negotiation; it does not state it
104

See Uri Weiss & Joseph Agassi, The Game Theory of the European Union Versus
the Pax Romana, 70 DEPAUL L. REV. 551, 556 (2020).
105
Situation in the State of Palestine, ICC-01/118-103, Observations by the Federal
Republic of Germany (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.icc-cpi.int/court-record/icc01/18-103. In its submission to the International Criminal Court, Germany claimed:
It is Germany's long-standing and consistent position to support a
negotiated two state solution and hence the goal of an independent,
democratic, sovereign and viable State of Palestine. To this end, Germany
aims at preserving the conditions allowing for a two-state solution.
Germany is one of the most important donors to the Palestinians, linking
development cooperation and stabilization funds to the build-up of state
institutions. However, it is Germany's consistent position that a
Palestinian State, and the determination of territorial boundaries, can be
achieved only through direct negotiations between Israelis and
Palestinians. The Court would be ill-suited for determination of these
issues.

Id.
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explicitly, but the implicit significance is that in a situation of failure
to reach an agreement, the state of war will continue. Thus, the two
bargaining sides know that if an agreement is not being achieved, the
state of war will continue, and this may lead to actual war. Each side's
alternative for an agreement is a state of war, namely, the game of a
state of war. Thus, the resisting payoff of each side is a function of its
payoff from playing the game of war, what may be called his value of
playing the war game. The resisting payoff is the payoff of a side in
the case of no agreement. The resisting payoff is also called the threat
payoff. Thus, the agreement will be a function of power, which
encourages us to prepare for war.
One alternative for the negotiation mechanism that we want to
discuss is the Litigotiation mechanism. The word “Litigotiation”
consists of negotiation and litigation; it is a negotiation in the shadow
of the law.106 This means that the two bargaining sides know that if
the negotiation fails, a specific court will decide on the solution. The
two parties may agree about a different tribunal, but there is a default
of legal mechanism that they cannot choose. In this case, the two sides
know that their alternative for an agreement is the game of litigation.
It is important to emphasize that the court is not going to decide in any
case. The great majority of cases are not going to arrive at a judicial
decision. The two sides are incentivized to come to a settlement in
order to save the litigation costs, including the risk, which is involved
in litigation.
The current dominant mechanism in international law is
negotiation.107 The International Court of Justice has no universal

106

Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal
Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984) (defining “litigotiation,” as “the
strategic pursuit of a settlement through mobilizing the court process”). For
Galanter’s general approach, see also Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves" Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 1 (1974).
107
See Robert P. Barnidge Jr., The International Law of Negotiation as a Means of
Dispute Settlement, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 545, 548 (2013) (“Negotiation is
undoubtedly the oldest means of dispute settlement. In their dissenting opinions in
Mavrommatis, Judges Moore and Pessa referred to it as, respectively, the ‘legal and
orderly administrative process by which governments, in the exercise of their
unquestionable powers, conduct their relations one with another and discuss, adjust
and settle, their differences’ and as ‘debate or discussion between the representatives
of rival interests, discussion during which each puts forward his arguments and
contests those of his opponent.’”). See The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions,
1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 11-12 (Aug. 30).
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jurisdiction.108 The proposal that this court will have universal
jurisdiction was rejected by the establishing states of the new order
after the Second World War. 109 The jurisdiction of this court is
dependent on the contest of the two parties (or on the authority given
by the Security Council or the General Assembly, which can ask for
advisory opinion).110 The new mechanism of the international criminal
court may change the picture since it has a partial universal jurisdiction
regarding war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
Let us now compare the game of international negotiation to
the game of international Litigotiation, namely, a game in which if
negotiation fails the parties will go to court. We will discuss what will
be the distributive effect from changing the game of negotiation in the
shadow of the war to a negotiation in the shadow of international law,
what new incentive this change will create, and how it will influence
the likelihood to achieve agreement.
A.

The Distributive Effect

The shift from a game of realist negotiation to a game of
negotiation in the shadow of the law has a significant distributive
effect. While in the realist negotiation game, the settlement is a
function of force, in the game of negotiation in the shadow of
international law it is a function of Law. If the international court has
full compliance, then the settlement will reflect more or less the
estimation of the judgment of the court, namely, the international legal
rights.
For the goal of illustration, let us take this example, in which
we compare two ideal games:
108

HUGH THIRLWAY, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 35 (2016).
Devika Hovell, The Authority of Universal Jurisdiction, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 427,
445 (2018) (“Despite the conscience of humanity having been pricked by the statedeployed barbarism of the Holocaust and World War II, there was still no discernible
shift from state to international jurisdiction . . . Although US Chief Prosecutor Robert
Jackson opened the trial at Nuremberg observing that ‘the real complaining party at
your bar is civilization’, the Nuremberg tribunal based its authority not on universal
jurisdiction but on the territorial jurisdiction of the occupying powers.”).
110
See U.N. Charter, art. 96 (“[1] The General Assembly or the Security Council
may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any
legal question. [2] Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies,
which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request
advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their
activities.”).
109
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Two sides have a dispute over a certain territory. The outcome
of a war between them regarding the territory will be such that the first
side is going to gain 75% of the territory, while the second only 25%.111
Each side evaluates its war cost to be equivalent to 15% of the territory.
In contrast, if they go to court, the judgment of the tribunal in this
particular case will be 50-50. The litigation costs of each side are
equivalent to 1% of the territory.
In the game of realist negotiation, i.e., a game in which the
parties negotiating without taking into account international law, each
party will not agree to any settlement, in which it awards less than its
outcome in a war minus its war costs. The first party will not agree to
any settlement, in which it awards less than 75-15=60. This means
that its resisting payoff is sixty. The second party will not agree to any
settlement, in which it awards less than 25-15=10. This means that its
resisting payoff is ten. The peace settlement creates a surplus of thirty,
which is the saving of war costs. If the two sides distribute equally the
surplus between them, the settlement will be 75-25.
In the game of negotiation in the shadow of international law
the parties are incentivized to come to a settlement in order to reduce
the litigation costs (in the ideal game that we discuss there is no legal
uncertainty as in real life, and legal uncertainty creates litigation
cost).112 This time, each party will not agree to any settlement, in
which it gets less than the judgment less the litigation costs. It means,
the first party will not agree to any settlement, in which it gets less than
50-1=49. The second party will also agree only to a settlement, in
which it gets at least 50-1=49. If they are going to equally distribute
the surplus between them, then the settlement will be 50-50.
We can see that the move from the negotiation mechanism to
the Litigotiation mechanism in this particular example leads to a shift
from a settlement of 75-25 to a settlement of 50-50. It means that this
move leads to a transfer of wealth of 25 from the strong party to the
weak party. While the first settlement reflects the balance of power in
war, the second settlement reflects the balance of rights in court. 113
111

It can be so since they are expected to divide the territory (75/25) at the end of the
war or because the first side has 75% to win the territory and the second only 25%.
112
Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 149,
149 (2019).
113
In the General Case, after we have shown the distributive effect in a particular
example, let us examine a more general case. The outcome of war is (W 1, W2). The
war costs are (WC1, WC2). The judgment is (J1, J2). The Litigation costs are (LC1,
LC2). Thus, in the Negotiation Mechanism, the threat payoff of the first side is W1-
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One may think that since in the realist negotiation game, the
strong benefits more territory than in the game of negotiation in the
shadow of the law, it is worthwhile for this state to play the realist
negotiation game. It is like saying: if you can rob without being caught
by the police, do it. This policy may give the country more territory,
but the honest policy will bring them more peace, security, democracy
and prosperity. This game shows why fascism is so dangerous: the
fetishism of territory without taking international law and justice
seriously leads to risky games. History tells us the price of fascism.
Of course, there is uncertainty regarding the result of the war.
A country may choose between the game of war that may lead it to loss
of life and the game of peace that may lead it to loss of territory they
may win in war. When we think about peace and war via this which
was proposed by Wald, this refutes the rationality of the nation’s
choice to go to war.114 The player who takes the decision to go to war
is usually the leader that in peace may lose his or her job, while in war
others’ lives. This is why the international criminal court is so
important, and particularly the (too limited) jurisdiction regarding
aggression: since the responsibility is individualistic, this may reduce
the agency problem in peace or war: the problem that many wars have
been caused because of the self-interest of the leaders.

WC1. The threat payoff of the second side is W 2-WC2. So, if they are going to
distribute the surplus equally, the settlement will be [W 1 + (WC2-WC1)/2, W2 +
(WC1-WC2)/2]. In the Litigation Mechanism, the threat payoff of the first side is J1LC1. The threat payoff of the second side is J2-LC2. So, if they are going to distribute
the surplus equally, the settlement will be [J 1 + (LC2-LC1)/2, J2 + (LC1-LC2)/2]. We
can see that in the move from the Negotiation Mechanism to the Litigation
Mechanism there is transfer of [J i + (LC-i-LCi)/2 – Wi – (WC-i-WCi)/2] = {Ji – Wi +
[(LC-i-LCi) – (WC-i-WCi)]/2}, which is the gap between its international rights and
its force.
114
See Abraham Wald, Statistical Decision Functions Which Minimize the Maximum
Risk, 46 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS 265 (1945). See also ABRAHAM WALD,
STATISTICAL DECISION FUNCTIONS 25, 52, 59 (1950). Abraham Wald asked a simple
question: if you do not know whether it is going to rain, what should you do? He
had a simple answer, but one that changes the theory dramatically: you need to
choose between two potential mistakes: that you will not take the umbrella and want
to use it, and that you will take it and not use it. Id. See also Abraham Wald, On the
Principles of Statistical Inference, 48 BULL. AMER. MATH. SOC’Y 639, 639-40
(1942). Clearly, you can decide what mistake is more expensive.
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The Morals from the Above Example

In every negotiation each side has a resisting payoff. It is their
payoff in the case of no agreement. The resisting payoff of a side is
the minimal sum that this side will accept. It is rational for a side to
reject lower proposals. In the negotiation mechanism the resisting
payoff of each side is their payoff from the playing game of war.
However, in the Litigotiation mechanism, the resisting payoff of each
side is their payoff from playing the game of an international
adjudication. In the negotiation mechanism the bargaining power of
each side is its force in war, while in the Litigotiation mechanism is its
rights in court.
Martin Luther King, Jr. distinguished Negative Peace from
Positive Peace.115 Negative Peace is the absence of tension, while
Positive Peace is also the presence of justice.116 We conclude that
realist negotiation leads to a negative peace, but not to a positive peace,
while playing the game of negotiation in the shadow of international
law leads to a positive Peace.
C.

The Reduction of Terrorism Effect

The realist negotiation game encourages each side to reduce the
payoff of the other side in the case of war, thus this game encourages
each side to maximize the war costs of its opponent. In order to
maximize their costs, it may take steps of terrorism, occupation, cruel
blockade, collective punishment, etc. Keynes said that what gives
trade union power in the negotiation is that they convince the employee
that they may strike in the future. 117 Trade unions strike in order to
indicate that they may strike tomorrow, that they adopt a strategy of
striking until their demands are accepted.118 Similarly, in a realist
negotiation game a side may terrorize in order to indicate that it may
terrorize again, if its demands are not met, that it adopts a strategy of
fighting until its demands are accepted.

115

Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham Jail, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
835, 842 (1992).
116
Id.
117
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, &
MONEY 257 (1936).
118
Id. See also Uri Weiss, About Suffering and Law in the Labour Market, 46 J.
CORP. L. 385 (2020).
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Let us illustrate. In the above-mentioned example, the resisting
payoff of the strong side was 60, which is payoff from playing the
game of war: (75) minus its war costs (10). Let us examine what will
happen if the weak side takes a policy of hard terrorism and increases
the war costs to 30. Then, the resisting payoff of the first side will be
75–30=45. If the first party doesn't increase the war costs of the
second party, then its resisting payoff will continue to be 25. Hence,
the settlement will be (65, 35). It means, that in the realist negotiation
game, when one party increases its terrorism, it also decreases the
resisting payoff of the other side.
However, if the game is negotiated in the shadow of
international law, then no party can benefit from increasing the war
costs of the other side (unless the court submits a threat in violence,
and this example teaches why courts should not give in to threats to
use violence).
We can study from this analysis that it is not true that
international law only interrupts state to fight terrorism. Actually, a
move from a mechanism of negotiation to an effective mechanism of
Litigotiation reduces terrorism dramatically. This move neutralizes
the incentive to terrorize and actually creates an incentive to be honest
in order to gain the sympathy of the court.
The abovementioned game may be changed even unilaterally.
If the strong party is ready to divide the land according to international
rights, it will abolish the incentive of the weak party to pursue
terrorism. Let us illustrate it: in the above-mentioned example, the
division according to international law is 50-50, while the division
according to the power is 75-25, when the weak side does not pursue
terrorism, and 65-35 while the weak side pursues terrorism. If the
strong side is ready to share the law 50-50 as international law
commands, it abolished the incentive to manage terrorism and even to
arm, but if the strong side refuses to respect international law, it leads
to an incentive to pursue terrorism. Our point is that changing the
game unilaterally by choosing to be obliged to international law leads
to a huge improvement.
In his Nobel lecture, Aumann claimed that “Isaiah is saying
that the nations can beat their swords into ploughshares when there is
a central government–a Lord, recognized by all. In the absence of that,
one can perhaps have peace–no nation lifting up its sword against
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another.”119 Our analysis teaches that even when we do not have a
central government to enforce international law, a state may reduce
dramatically the incentive to arm against them by being committed to
international law, and that the state can do it even unilaterally.
D.

The Effect on the Chance to Achieve Peace

According to the theory of Ronald Coase, the parties will
maximize their pie, if there is no transaction cost. 120 Coase did not
define what transaction cost is, and the law and economics read him as
saying that if there is no failure in the way of rational sides to maximize
their common pie they will do it regardless to the initial allocation of
the property rights or the legal rules (when they do not limit the
freedom of contracts).121 This seems trivial, but it is also wrong, since
it is not true for example when a dollar for the rich is not equivalent to
a dollar for the poor.122 Despite this, we can study from Coase to ask
what failures prevent agreements even when the two sides have an
opportunity to achieve mutual gain, and how to prevent those potential
failures. We can also study from Coase’s theory that the default is that
the sides will not dismiss opportunities to mutual gain, and that in order
to understand why and when agreements fail, we can think about
failures. There are obstacles that prevent rational players from
119

Robert J. Aumann, supra note 71, at 17078.
RONALD H. COASE, CLASSIC PAPERS IN NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS: The
Problem of Social Cost 87-137 (1960).
121
This is how Posner summarized what he called the Coase Theorem: “[i]f
transaction costs are zero, the initial assignment of a property right—for example,
whether to the polluter or to the victim of pollution—will not affect the efficiency
with which resources are allocated.” Richard A. Posner, Ronald Coase and
Methodology, 7 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 195, 195 (1993). This is how Weiss
translated the Coase theorem to the language of game theory: “the wrongdoing will
be done if and only if the total benefit of the coalition of the manager and the sender
from making the wrongdoing is bigger than the total cost of this coalition from
committing the wrongdoing, including the transaction cost that is needed in order to
create this coalition.” Uri Weiss, The Talmudic Prisoner's Dilemma, 37 TOURO L.
REV. 341 (2021).
122
See Leonid Hurwicz, What is the Coase Theorem?, 7 JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 49,
49-74 (1995) (“The Coase Theorem is interpreted as asserting that the equilibrium
level of an externally (e.g., pollution) is independent of institutional factors (in
particular, assignment of liability for damage), except in the presence of transaction
costs. It is shown here that absence of income effects (due to parallel preferences or
quasi-linear utility functions) is not only sufficient (which is well known) but also
necessary for this to be true.”).
120
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reaching agreements. In the case of internal legal disputes, the option
of litigation prevents the violence. This solution should be applied to
international relations too.
Rational players may go to war; we will analyze the potential
failures of the parties' way to achieve agreement, and then will attempt
to find solutions for them. For example, since one of the major
problems in achieving an agreement is a lack of information—
asymmetric information123 or excessive optimism—we will propose to
establish mechanisms of information flow as a way to improve the
chance to achieve peace. Wilson was right when he determined that
every treaty between countries should be transparent, 124 and this
principle should be extended to other factors that influence the balance
of power. One modest but very important outcome of this
recommendation might be to open international negotiations to media
coverage.
We can learn from discussion that also perfect rational players
may fail to achieve cooperation, even when it is for their mutual
advantage. Aumann proposed to learn from this that we should not
say: “let’s make love, not war.”125 The truth is the opposite: since we
cannot rely on mutual rationality to prevent wars, we should
discourage hostile feelings, and encourage friendly feelings. Another
moral is that since negotiation sometimes fails, we cannot rely on
negotiation, but need to have international institutions, such as
international courts. We should have institutions that in the case
negotiation fails, the adopted alternative will not be war. Litigation,
and not war, should be the continuation of politics by other means.
Bertrand Russell famously referred to the Cold War as a game
of "chicken" between two teenagers driving toward each other on a
collision course.126 One of the drivers must swerve, or both may die
in the crash, but if one driver swerves and the other doesn't, the one
who swerved will be called a "chicken," meaning a coward.127 Russell
used the analogy to support his call for nuclear disarmament—as the
123

Akerlof, supra note 84, at 488.
The Fourteen Points, (President Woodrow Wilson), available at
https://www.theworldwar.org/learn/peace/fourteen-points (last visited Sept. 1,
2022).
125
See Robert J. Aumann, Game Engineering, Discussion Paper #518, Hebrew Univ.
Jerusalem 1, 11 (2009), https://sites.duke.edu/niou/files/2011/05/Aumann-GameEngineering.pdf.
126
BERTRAND W. RUSSELL, COMMON SENSE AND NUCLEAR WARFARE 30 (1959).
127
Id.
124
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possibility of a "crash" exists.128 To achieve it, Russell supported the
international government.129
Moreover, an additional obstacle to agreement may be that a
party will not wish to give in to unfair demand; it is recognized in game
theory that proposals that seem to be unfair may be rejected even in
one-time anonymous situation.130 The strategy of not capitulating to
unfair demand may be rational, at least when it is a submission to
coercion. This is so since a strategy of not giving in to coercion may
prevent the coercion and a strategy of giving in to coercion invites the
coercion. In international conflict each side tends to think that it is
right. This tendency is usually strengthened by the indoctrination of
the formal educational system. People who appeal to the national
narrative may be denounced as traitors. When the two sides have two
contradicted narratives or values, there may be a situation that there is
no agreement that will be seen by both sides to be one that is not a
submission to coercion. When this is the case, and when each side
commits itself sufficiently not to submit to coercion, there will be no
agreement. International litigation may play a very important role
here: it prevents this game, if respecting the decision of an international
court is not to be perceived as a submission to coercion. Moreover,
while war incentivizes each side to demonize the other side, litigation
incentivizes each side to understand the claims of the other side.
International Litigation may prevent the above-mentioned failure in
the way to peace agreement. The option of international litigation in
case negotiation fails discourages sides from committing to hard lines.
Let us imagine that the Israeli Aumann will negotiate with the
Palestinian Aumann; each of them will say that all the holy land is
mine. I wish to have peace. However, the right way to make peace is
not by concessions. If I give you a part of the holy land, I will
incentivize you to command terrorism against me, since it is clear for
both of us that I will not make any concession if it was not in my
interest, and it is not in my interest to give you anything if you do not
have power to oblige me. The inevitable result will be endless war.
Respecting international law prevents the game of Aumann versus
Aumann, and this is a big advantage of countries who respect
128

Id.
Id.
130
An example is the ultimatum game. See Alvin E. Roth et al., Bargaining and
Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental
Study, 81 AM, ECON. REV. 1068, 1068 (1991).
129
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international law. A peaceful nation will not adopt a strategy that if
the two sides take it, it makes peace impossible, and international law
should discourage such strategies.
In one of his public lectures, Aumann explained that it is
rational to say: that all is mine. It is his lesson from the Mishna: 131
Two holding a garment. One of them says, “I found it,”
and the other says, “I found it.” One of them says, “It
is all mine,” and the other says, “It is all mine.” Then,
one swears that his share in it is not less than half, and
the other swears that his share in it is not less than half
and it should then be divided between them. 132
Aumann explained his support in the New-Right party by saying that
they are convinced that the Jewish people have a right on all the holy
land.133
Aumann dismisses that if a party says that everything is its
own, then either this side closes the door before any compromise or
makes any compromise to be a submission to force, what he sees as
encouraging terrorism.134 Thus, Aumann repeated the mistake of
Ze’ev Jabotinsky, who said that he studied a little bit of Talmud but
gained his (political) wisdom from the Talmud and said that he
concluded from the abovementioned Mishna that we should say that
all the holy land is ours.135 Similar to Aumann, Jabotinsky saw
compromises as encouraging terrorism, and he resisted even to
131

Of course, it is a misreading of the Talmud. The Talmud assumes that every party
speaks sincerely, and the Talmud obliges each side to take an Oath that he has at least
half of the Tallit. (We thank Eli Raful for the last observation regarding the Otha, a
private conversation with Uri Weiss.).
132
THE MISHNAH: A NEW INTEGRATED TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY: Mishnah
Bava Metzia 1:1. (Machon Y. Trust trans., 2012).
133
Naftali Bennett, Nobel Prize winner Yisrael Aumann announces support for the
New
Right,
YOUTUBE
(Mar.
12,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Ki4F4Ff9RY&t=58s.
134
Amanda Borschel-Dan, Israeli-Palestinian Peace A Matter of Incentives, Says
Nobel Laureate Aumann, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Dec. 13, 2018, 4:05 PM),
https://www.timesofisrael.com/mideast-peace-a-matter-of-incentives-says-nobellaureate-aumann/ (“‘The common wisdom—or foolishness—is that making
concessions will bring peace. It doesn’t bring about peace, it brings about war—it’s
the opposite,’ he said. ‘The expulsion from Gaza has brought all the wars in the Gaza
area ever since. We are giving them incentives to keep pressing. We are rewarding
their attacks.’”).
135
Ze’ev Jabotinsky, a Program for temporal government in Israel, Jaffa (1919)
(available in Hebrew at https://benyehuda.org/read/7047).
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negotiation in the argument that it will lead the other side to illusions
that will lead to more resistance by it.136 The combination of the
proposals of Jabotinsky is what makes them so dangerous.
States that instead of claiming strategically: “all is mine,”
recognize the international legal rights of the other side, and adopt a
strategy of respecting international law and are ready to litigate in the
case if dispute, will have much more peace and security.
The game of negotiation is not enough in order to ensure peace.
Thus, it is better to choose to play the game of negotiation plus
respecting international law. By choosing to respect international law,
a nation changes the game they play, having more opportunities to
peace, and incentivizes much less terrorism against them.
VI.

CONCLUSION

We compared two games of international negotiations. In one
game the inability to resolve a conflict by negotiation leads to war. In
the other game, this inability leads to some international courts. The
first game leads to negotiations under the shadow of war, whereas the
second game leads to negotiations under the protection of international
law. There are three important differences between these games. The
first difference between these games is the distributive effect: in it each
player can threaten the other. This renders negotiations a function of
military setups. In the second game, the threat is of litigation in the
international court. This renders negotiation a function of international
law. The second difference between these games is that the first game
provides incentives for armament for each party so as to render threats
to attack credible. The third difference concerns situations that follow
failures of negotiations. Sometimes parties fail to reach agreement
even though potential agreements exist that would make all parties
better off.
The above comparison between two games of international
negotiations leads to two morals. First, the international community
should change the game of international relations. The international
community should oblige or at least encourage international
arbitration. The second, perhaps more important, moral is this. States
should unilaterally reduce conflict by preferring the game of
ZE’EV
JABOTINSKY,
THE
IRON
http://en.jabotinsky.org/media/9747/the-iron-wall.pdf.
136

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center,

WALL

(1925),

43

Touro Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 3 [], Art. 7

936

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38

negotiation under the shadow of international law over any game
played under the threat of war. When a state is committed to
international law, then they improve their own security. This is so
since they thereby declare that they will not attack their neighbours
even when easy victory is assured. The commitment to respect
international law reduces dramatically the incentive for playing the
game of arms race. We thus recommend every country to adopt the
policy of honesty, namely, of respecting international law unilaterally,
and of conditional generosity. Generosity is the readiness to yield
more than the law demands.
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